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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rINCENT CHIODO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BEAR RIYER TELEPHONE 
COMPANY, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10473 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for breach of an employment 
agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court without a jury. 
From a decision and judgment for the plaintiff, defen-
dant appeals. 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment aud 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, 
a new trial. 
STATE.MENT O:F .FACTS 
This action was commenced by Vincent Chiodo 
and others against General 'V aterworks Corporation, 
a Delaware corporation, Bear River Telephone Com-
pany, a Utah corporation, and 2500 shares of stock of 
Bear River Telephone Company, a Utah corporation. 
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties this Court on 
September 29, 1964, entered its order dismissing the 
complaint against General 'Vaterworks Corporation 
for lack of jurisdiction. By stipulation of the parties 
entered into in open court on April 2, 1964, the service 
of process against the 2500 shares of stock of Bear l{iyer 
Telephone Company was quashed for lack of in rem 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial of this matter was 
limited to an action between Vincent Chiodo and thr 
Bear River Telephone Company for breach of an em-
ployment contract. There are no other issues and no 
other parties involved in this appeal. 
The defendant Bear River Telephone Company is 
a Utah corporation which has existed in this state since 
1905 (Ex. 37). 
The plaintiff Vincent Chiodo first acquired stock 
ownership in the Bear River Telephone Company lll 
2 
!94<3 when he acquired fifty-one per cent of the out-
standing stock ( R. 20) . At the time of the occurrence 
of the events out of which this controversy arose, he 
11 as its general manager and principal stockholder. 
On December 21, 1960, as a result of negotiations 
beginning on or about .May 5, 1960, plaintiff sold his 
stock in the llear River Telephone Company to General 
Waterworks Corporation and on January 18, 1961, 
plaintiff entered into the employment agreement here 
in question (Ex. 6) with the Bear River Telephone 
Company. This agreement provides as follows: 
January 3, 1961 
Mr. Vincent Chiodo 
651 North Third Street East 
Tremonton, Utah 
Dear .Mr. Chiodo : 
Since 1943 you have been active in the opera-
tion and management of Uear River Telephone 
Company (Bear River) and you presently hold 
the offices of Vice President and General Mana-
ger in that company. 
As you know, Bear River has recently become 
a subsidiary of General 'Vaterworks Corpora-
tion. This letter is written to confirm our under-
standing with you concerning your continuing 
employment by Bear River and the nature of 
your duties. 
In accordance with the understanding and 
agreement which we h~we arrived at, your em-
ployment by Bear River is to contin.ue for a 
period of ten years from the date hereof. At the 
3 
end of such ten-year ~eriod your continuing 
employment by Bear River shall be considered 
by you and by us, and shall be subject to such 
agreement as may then be arrived at. Nothing in 
this letter agreement, however, shall be held to 
preclude your continuing employment by Bear 
River after such ten-year period. 
Your duties shall be those of manager of Hear 
River, which presently operates telephone ex-
changes in and about the municipalities of Tre-
monton, Bear River City, Snowville, Fielding, 
Thatcher and Garland, Box Elder County, 
Utah, and such other duties as may be assigned 
to you from time to time. Such duties shall in-
clude the management of such other telephone 
properties as may be acquired by Bear River 
from time to time, either through purchase or ex-
pansion, or such other telephone companies in 
the Utah area as may become subsidiaries of 
our parent company, General Waterworks Cor-
poration. You shall, if so requested and if you 
are elected to that office, act as a vice president 
of Bear River from time to time. You shall de-
vote your full time to Bear River and to such 
other telephone subsidiaries of General 'Vater-
works Corporation. 
Your salary for the duties performed by yon 
for Bear River during the term of this agreement 
shall be $12,000 per year beginning January l, 
1961 and payable in semi-monthly installments 
of $500 each. 
In the event of any substantial increase in our 
work load because of the expansion of the Bear 
River telephone properties or the acquisition by 
General Waterworks Corporation of other tele-
phone properties in the Utah area, the cornpen-
4 
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sation to be paid you shall be increased, the 
amount of such increase to be arrived at by mu-
tual agreement between us. 
In connection with our retirement and insur-
ance plan for our employees, there has been 
issued to you by New England .Mutual Life In-
surance Company its .Monthly Retirement In-
come contract #2,330,952 in the face amount of 
$10,000 and which contract provides, among 
other things, for certain retirement income pay-
ments to you. The annual premium for such con-
tract is $1,520. 'Ve have paid 75% of such pre-
mium each year since the contract was issued 
and you have paid 25% thereof, which arrange-
ment shall continue. Our obligation to pay any 
part of such premiums shall terminate upon (a) 
your death, ( b) November 1, 1969, or ( c) your 
leaving our employment, whichever event shall 
first occur. 
If the foregoing correctly sets forth the under-
standing which we have arrived at will you please 
so indicate by your acceptance thereof on the 
enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me. 
BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE 
COMPANY 
Bv Isl A. W. Sanders 
· Executive Yice President 
The foregoing correctly sets 
forth my understanding with 
you and is agreed to this 
18th day of January, 1961. 
Is/ Vincent Chiodo 
Vincent Chiodo 
5 
Prior to the acquisition of the stock of Bear River . 
Telephone Company by General Waterworks Corpora- ! 
tion, a series of meetings and negotiations took place 
between plaintiff and representatives of General '.y ater-
works Corporation relative to the employment contract 
which would be entered into by Bear River Telephone 
Company after General Waterworks Corporation ' 
acquired the Bear River Telephone Company stock and 
elected directors. The final draft of this agreement and 
the one which was actually entered into was furnished 
to plaintiff on November 4, 1960 (Exs. 5 and 6). 
During the course of negotiations, a meeting was 
held on August 3, 1960, in Logan, Utah, between A. W. 
Sanders, a representative of General Waterworks Cor-
poration, and Vincent Chiodo. The discussion at this 
meeting was recorded by a certified shorthand reporter 
(Ex. l) . The trial court concluded that the negotiations 
of General Waterworks Corporation relative to the 
employment contract including the Logan discussion 
were ratified by the Bear River Telephone Company 
when it entered into the employment agreement (R. 
649). 
Pursuant to the written employment agreement 
Vincent Chiodo continued in his position as manager 
of Bear River Telephone Company from the time 
General Waterworks Corporation acquired the stock 
of Bear River Telephone Company until December IO. 
1963, when he was discharged. Almost from the moment 
General 'Vaterworks took over as owner of the cou-
6 
trolling interest of Bear River Telephone Company, 
i Chiodo evidenced his regret in having sold his control 
in the Company (Ex. 22 and Exs. 30-32) . This linger-
ing regret came to a climax late in July of 1961, just 
six months later, when Chiodo was informed by rep-
resentatives of General 'Vaterworks Corporation that 
, a trade of the property with .Mountain State Telephone 
& Telegraph Company was a possibility and that if con-
summated, Chiodo was through as manager (R. 40-41). 
Although this trade did not come about, Chiodo took 
the announcement as a declaration of war and embarked 
upon a program of non-cooperation, internal sabotage 
and general insubordination to force the Company to 
discharge him. Pursuant to this deliberate program, 
\'incent Chiodo engaged in various "unorthodox" prac-
, tices which led to his eventual discharge. Some of these 
acts were characterized by the trial court as "moonlight 
operations, as we call it, double work contracts and all 
kinds of unorthodox employment practices" (R. 592). 
Chiodo's tactics successfully culminated in his discharge 
effective December 10, 1963 (Ex. 49). A summary of 
the grounds for discharge of Vincent Chiodo established 
by defendant at the trial is as follows: 
_ 1. Vincent Chiodo falsified payroll records for his 
son, Don Chiodo (Ex. 101, 11116/62, R. 407, Ex. 83, 
R. 24.J.) and instructed a subordinate employee to pre-
vare other false payroll records for his son, Don Chiodo, 
so Don Chiodo could be paid by Bear River Telephone 
Company even though he was then working in Montana 
forauother employer (R. 249, 411-412, Exs. 83, 101). 
7 
2. Vincent Chiodo permitted and condoned other 
payroll practices permitting improper payments to be 
made directly and indirectly to members of his family 
'' including his 14-year-old granddaughter (R. 199-389· 
' Exs. 50-98, R. 468, 470, Ex. 109). 
3. Vincent Chiodo instructed subordinate employees 
to engage in improper payroll practices by improperly 
reporting their own time in violation of the Federal 
Wage and Hour laws (R. 428, 466). 
4. Vincent Chiodo actively engaged in a subterfuge 
to obtain the stock of Bear River Telephone Company 
from its principal shareholder, for an undisclosed prin-
cipal while he was employed as manager and vice-presi-
dent of Bear River Telephone Company (R. 130-134, 
Ex. 42). 
5. Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to the Utah Public 
Utilities Commission and the R.E.A. in 'iVashington 
concerning the proposed exchange of stock of the Bear 
River Telephone Company by the owner of said stock 
when he was informed of such proposal on a confidential 
basis by his employer and was specifically instructed 
to keep this information private (R. 41-42, Exs. 23, 31). 
6. Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to his superiors 
which were disrespectful and insolent, communicated 
this disrespect to his subordinates and instructed his own 
subordinate employees not to provide any information 
to the main office which was not specifically asked for 
(R. 316-324, 326, 393-402, 425-426, 489). 
8 
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7. Vincent Chiodo instructed his subordinate em-
' ployees not to make proper billings to customers of 
Bear River Telephone Company and to prepare the 
records in such a way that the home office could not 
determine what was being done ( R. 438-445). 
8. Vincent Chiodo refused to follow specific direc-
tions from his superiors in the simple matter of the can-
cellation of an insurance policy on Bear River Tele-
phone Company equipment (R. 570, Exs. 30, 31, 32). 
Plaintiff's case was: 
(a) That the contract was part of the deal for the 
sale of the controlling stock of Bear River Telephone 
Company to General Waterworks Corporation and 
hence not terminable for any reason; 
(b) That plaintiff was a good manager and should 
not have been discharged; and 
( c) That the grounds shown by defendant did not 
constitute good cause. 
The trial court ruled against plaintiff on the first 
issue, and defendant did not dispute that the telephone 
company was profitably operated while Chiodo was 
manager. As to the third issue, the trial court con-
cluded ( R. 596-597) : 
" ... while the plaintiff's conduct has certainly 
not been lilywhite, considering the Sodam and 
Gomorrah community that he was working in 
at that time, I'm not going to charge him with 
such a serious violation in the light of the sur-
9 
rounding circumstances and surrounding metJi. 
ods of operation so as to justify discharge." 
After stating fully its conclusions ( R. 588-593), 
the trial court adopted over defendant's objection~ 
(R. 674-677) findings of fact and conclusions of law 
stating that the discharge of Chiodo was wrongful and 
"without just cause or excuse" and awarded Chiodo a 
judgment in the full amount of the contractual salary 
for the balance of the ten-year term of the contract plus 
certain fringe benefits as allowed by the contract. 
It is defendant's contention on this appeal: 
I. That the conclusion of the trial court is not sup· 
ported by the evidence, and that defendant is entitled 
to a judgment, no cause of action as a matter of law. 
2. Failing that, the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial. 
3. Failing that, the judgment should be reduced 
by the amount Chiodo could reasonably be expected to 
earn during the balance of the ten-year contractual 
period, or alternatively that defendant be awarded judg· 
ment on its counterclaim for the damages incurred Ly 
it in having to replace Chiodo with a loyal manager. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
HERE IN ISSUE MAY BE TERMINATED 
FOR CAUSE "\VITHOUT LIABILITY FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
10 
The general rule as to employment contracts is 
that the relationship is one at the will of either party, 
and it may be so terminated. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge 
Truck Center, Inc., 11Utah2d l, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). 
In the case at bar, the contract between Chiodo and 
Bear River Telephone Company was for a term of ten 
years. This provision qualifies the Bullock rule to require 
the employer to show cause, i.e. a breach of an express 
or implied term of the contract by one party to excuse 
performance by the other. Defendant contends that it 
has clearly established several such breaches of contract 
by Chiodo. 
Restatement of The Law (Second), Agency 
(1958) hereinafter referred to as Restatement, Agency, 
states in Section 409: 
" ( 1) A principal is privileged to discharge 
before the time fixed by the contract of employ-
ment an agent who has committed such a viola-
tion of duty that his conduct constitutes a ma-
terial breach of contract or who, without com-
mitting a violation of duty, fails to perform or 
reasonably appears to be unable to perform a 
material part of the promised service, because 
of physical or mental disability. 
" ( 2) The election by the principal not to dis-
charge the agent for a breach of duty does not 
of itself release the agent from liability for loss 
caused by the breach nor, if the agent commits 
subsequent breaches of duty, is the principal 
prevented from electing subsequently to treat 
the first breach as cause for discharge." 
11 
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In the comments on Subsection (I) of Section 409 , 
Restatement, Agency, it is stated as follows: 
"b. What breach justifies dismissal. As stated 
in Section ll8, a principal can terminate any 
specific authority of an agent at any time, and 
can also terminate the relation between them. 
He cannot, however, do this rightfully before 
the end of the period for which he has agreed 
to employ the agent, unless the agent has com-
mitted a material breach of contract or has 
failed to perform a condition. An unexcused 
failure substantially to perform the work which 
he has contracted to do, or a serious violation 
of the duty of loyalty or of obedience, constitutes 
an entire breach of contract. A wilful disobedi-
ence or a violation of duty of loyalty may con-
stitute a material breach of contract although 
the harm likely to arise from such breach is verv 
small. In other matters, the harm arising fro~ 
the breach is a matter to be considered in deter-
mining whether or not the misconduct of the 
agent is sufficiently serious to be a cause for 
discharge." 
Also, Section 399 states: 
"A principal whose agent has violated or 
threatens to violate his duties has an appropriate 
remedy for such violation. Such remedy mar be: 
" ( · ) d. h " J 1sc arge; or ... 
As appears from the Restatement, A,gency. as 
above set forth, a contract of employment may be right-
fully terminated before the time fixed by the contract 
if the agent has violated his duty of loyalty or of 
12 
l 
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l 
obedience to the employer. This same rule is also sum-
marized in J5 Am. Jur., 1lf aster and Servant, Section 
40: 
"Generally.-,Vhile if a contract of employ-
ment is general in regard to the term of employ-
ment the employer may terminate it at will with-
out incurring liability to the employee for the 
discharge, where an employee is engaged for a 
definite term of employment, the employer, in 
order to justify a dismissal of the employee dur-
ing the agreed term, must be able to show a 
breach on the part of the employee of some ex-
press or implied provision of the contract of 
service. The implied provisions of such a contract 
are violated when the servant does something 
inconsistent with the relation of master and 
servant or incompatible with the due and faithful 
performance of his duties. As typical of the 
causes or reasons which will justify the dismissal 
of an employee before termination of the con-
tract of employment may be mentioned neglect 
of duty, negligence, incompetence, or ineffici-
ency; dishonesty; intoxication; disobedience of 
the· employer's ;ules, instructions, or orders; in-
solence or disrespect; unfaithfulness to the em-
ployer's interests; immoral, disreputable, and 
unbecoming conduct ;-in short, anything which 
indicates unfitness for the service for which the 
employee was engaged. These general principles 
apply with reference to the right to discharge 
employees in executive or supervisory capacities 
as well as those in subordinate positions, al-
though, perhaps, one holding a supervisory posi-
tion has more latitude in the performance of his 
duties than does a mere clerk or workman; the 
extent of his discretion, however, depends upon 
the particular circumstances." 
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That an employer need not retain an employee who 
disobeys the employer's rules, instructions and orders, 
who is insolent and disrespectful and is unfaithful to lhe 
employer's interests would seem to be axiomatic. How-
ever, see, e.g., Polk v. Missouri P.R. Co., 245 S.W. 186 
(Ark. 1922); Borg v. International Sisal Co., 4 N.W. 
2d 113, 141 A.L.R. 657 (Minn. 1942); Craig v. 1'homp-
son, 244 S.W. 2d 37 (Mo.); Haag v. Revell, 184 P.2d 
442 (Wash.). 
The Haag v. Revell case, supra, involved a question 
of discharge of an employee for insolence and the court 
summarized the law as follows: 
"Appellant prays for reversal upon several 
grounds. It is urged that the ground of discharge 
which the court found valid, was not pleaded. 
However, no objection was made to the intro· 
duction of the evidence, which tended to estab-
lish that ground. If objection had been made, 
we think it would have been rightly overruled. 
Plaintiff alleged that he was discharged 'without 
cause.' The defendant categorically denied that 
allegation and, therefore, had the right to intro-
duce evidence that there was a cause. A broad 
field was opened by the plaintiff's allegation 
that he was discharged without cause. It is said 
in 35 Am. Jur. 471, § 37: 
" 'It is not necessary that an employer, in 
order to justify a dismissal, show that in dismiss-
ing his employee he in fact acted upon so~e. 
proper ground of dismissal. It is sufficient ~f 
a ground of dismissal existed at that time. lt 1~ 
not material whether the employer knew .of 
grounds which in fact existed at the time of dis-
14 
charge; notwithstanding his ignorance, he may 
avail himself thereof, and in the event of his 
death, his representative has the same right. 
Nor is it material that the employer assigned 
another ground as the cause of the employee's 
dismissal. The employer may justify a dismissal 
by relying on a ground different from that as-
signed at the time of the dismissal.' (Emphasis 
added). 
"The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, 
relied upon certain sections of the article on Mas-
ter and Servant in 35 Am . .J" ur., a limited portion 
of which we quote: 
" 'Unprovoked insolence or disrespect on the 
part of the employee toward the employer or the 
latter's representative may afford ground for the 
discharge or dismissal of the employee prior to 
the conclusion of the term of employment.' 35 
Am. Jur. 480, § 48. 
" 'Even though one's services are engaged by 
another for a definite term, the employer may 
discharge him for good cause during the term of 
the employment without incurring liability for 
breach of contract. This is true even where the 
contract of employment stipulates that the em-
ployee shall be retained in the service during the 
term of his life.' 35 Am. J ur. 470, § 36. 
"Appellant relies largely upon the case of 
~f clntosh v. Abbot, 231 lVIass. 180, 120 N.E. 
383. The case of Dorrance v. Hoopes, 122 Md. 
344, 90 A. 92, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1012, is even 
closer to the instant case in its facts. 
"The law governing discharge for insolence 
is well settled . The real value of the cases just 
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cited is that they demonstrate that every case 
of this kind must be decided upon its own facts." 
II. VINCENT CHIODO WAS AN AGENT 
OF BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE COMPANY 
BY VIRTUE 011-. THE EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT AND THE ACTIONS OF' 
VINCENT CHIODO DURING THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH BEAR 
RIVER TELEPHONE COMP ANY YVERE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE RELATION 
OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND BEAR 
RIVER TELEPHONE COMP ANY HAD 
GOOD CAUSE FOR HIS DISCHARGE. 
The contract in question (Ex. 6) is set forth, 
supra. The trial court determined that this contract was 
to be interpreted (contrary to defendant's contention) 
by a consideration of all prior negotiations including the 
transcript of a conversation held in Logan, Utah, on 
August 3, 1960 (Ex. I). Even accepting this ruling, 
arguendo, it is still clear that the agreement between 
the Bear River Telephone Company and Vincent Chiodo 
was one of master and servant. While plaintiff seems 
to take the position that he was given broad manage· 
ment authority by the discussion in Logan (Ex. I) he 
has not alleged nor shown that he was an independent 
contractor and not subject to any control by or duty 
to the officers and directors of the Bear River Telephone 
Company. There is nothing in that transcript to justify 
either plaintiff or an impartial reader in concluding 
that Chiodo was to run the Bear River Telephone Corn· 
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pany as his own master, free from any control by the 
representatives of the new owner, all without any duty 
of loyalty to his corporate employer and its new cor-
porate stockholder. 
The following are specific breaches by Vincent 
Chiodo which justify his discharge: 
A. Payroll Padding. 
Section 387 of the Restatement, Agency, provides 
as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject 
to a duty to his principal to act solely for the 
benefit of the principal in all matters connected 
with his agency." 
In Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.,V.2d 530, 
91 A.L.R.2d 662, 679 (Tex.Cir.App. 1960) the court 
said: 
"It is true that many cases state the rule broad-
ly to be that whether an act occurred is, if the 
evidence is conflicting, a question of fact for the 
jury, and, if the jury finds it did occur, the ques-
tion of whether it constitutes good cause for dis-
charge is a question of law for the court to decide. 
However, while the rule is thus broadly stated, 
we think no more was intended than that under 
the facts of the particular case, the acts of the 
employee were such, as a matter of law, as to 
bt:> good cause for discharge. These cases, for the 
most part, were cases of violation of reasonable 
and substantial rules governing the employee in 
performance of his work, or aggravated cases of 
refusal to obey reasonable orders of the employer 
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that amounted to insubordination, or, CMes of 
clearly dishonest acts toward the emplover 011 
the part of the employee in the attempted per-
formance of the employee's work, or acts such 
as an unprovoked fight by an employee with rm 
officer of the employer in the presence of other 
employees. Royal Oak Stave Company v. Grace 
Tex Civ App, 113 SW 2d 315, writ dism; Rob'. 
ertson v. Panhandle, S. F. Ry. Co., Tex Civ 
App, 77 SW2d 1078, writ dism; Matlocl..· v 
Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co., Tex Civ App, 99 S\V2d 
1056, writ dism; Swilley v Galveston, H. & S.A. 
Ry. Co., Tex Civ App, 96 SW2d 105, writ dism; 
Shute & Limont v McVitie, Tex Civ App, 72 
SW 433. (Emphasis added). 
It is unusual when it is possible by uncontroverted 
evidence to prove that payroll records have been falsified 
so as to permit improper payments to employees. It 
is a fully documented fact in this case, that Vincent 
Chiodo himself prepared false payroll records for the 
benefit of his son, Don Chiodo, and also directed his 
subordinate employee, Maurice Staples, to prepare 
other false payroll records for Don Chiodo. 
Between November 15, 1962 and November 24, 
1962, Don Chiodo was in Montana working for Max 
Fonnesbeck (Ex. 83) and was paid for the work there 
performed for Bonneville Construction Company (R. 
249) . During the precise same period the time sheets 
for Don Chiodo as a regular employee of Bear River 
Telephone Company (Ex. 101) showed he was work-
ing full time at specific company facilities located a 
long way from Montana (Ex. 101). It was not dis· 
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puted that he was paid his regular salary by the com-
pany for that period. One of these time sheets was 
tilled in personally by Vincent Chiodo showing his 
snn as working at Tremonton and Fielding on No-
yember 16, 1962 for a total of eight hours. 
"Q And the first daily time sheet, who prepared 
that 1 [Ex. 101. 11116/62] 
"A I put in the head and Mr. Chiodo filled in 
the hours and code. 
"Q .Mr. Don Chiodo? 
"A Mr. Vincent Chiodo." (R. 406-407). 
The others for the period were filled in with false infor-
mation stating that Don Chiodo was on the job for 
Bear River Telephone Company by employee Staples 
pursuant to directions from Vincent Chiodo (R. 411-
412). 
"Q Now do you know whether Don Chiodo was 
in Tremonton all during the time that those 
time tickets cover? 
"A No, he wasn't in Tremonton during this 
whole period. 
"l\iR. RAl\IPTON: You mean he was there 
none of the time or was not there all the time? 
"A He wasn't there all the time. Some of the 
time he was there. 
"Q Did you prepare some of those time tickets 
or daily time reports yourself? 
"A Yes. 
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"Q Who instructed you, or were you instructed 
to fill these time sheets out? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Who instructed you that you should fill them 
out? 
"A Mr. Vincent Chiodo. 
"Q What did he say? 
"A He just told me the account numbers to 
use for these days that Don wasn't here. 
"MR. RAMPTON: As to what'? 
"A As to the days he wasn't there. 
"Q Are the numbers which Mr. Vincent Chiodo 
told you to use in recording these time records 
the numbers which appear thereon now? 
"A Yes." 
The time records for Don Chiodo prepared by Max 
Fonnesbeck compared with the Bear River Telephone 
Company records for the same period prepared by 
Vincent Chiodo or by Mr. Staples pursuant to Vincent 
Chiodo's instructions show: 
Date 
11/15/62 
Max Fonnesbeck Record 
(Ex. 83) 
Logan to Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 8 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 8 hours 
20 
Bear River Tele-
phone Company 
Daily Time Report 
of Don Chiodo 
(Ex. 101) 
Repairs to Pole 
Lines 
Code 3 
f Tremonton] 
8 hours 
l 
Date 
ll 1 Hi/62 
llil7/62 
11'19/62 
11 20/62 
Max Fonnesbeck Record 
(Ex. 83) 
Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
Bear River Tele-
phone Company 
Daily Time Report 
of Don Chiodo 
<Ex. 101) 
Code 903 
[Tremonton] 
4 hours 
Code 905 
[Fielding] 
4 hours 
No time sheet 
No time sheet 
Code 3 
[Tremonton] 
4 hours 
Code 5 
[Fielding] 
4 hours 
Code 3 
[Tremonton] 
4 hours 
Code 4 
[Promontory l 
4 hours 
ll '21152 Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours Code 3 
[Tremonton] 
8 hours 
.Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
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Date 
Max Fonnesbeck Record 
(Ex. 83) 
Bear River Tele. 
P!tone Company 
Dally Time Report 
of Don Chiodo 
<Ex. 101) 
11/22/62 Great Falls No time sheet 
Don Chiodo 9 hours (Thanksgiving) 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
II/23/62 Great Falls 
Don Chiodo 9 hours Code 4 
[Promontory] 
8 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 9 hours 
II/24/62 Great Falls to Logan No time sheet 
Don Chiodo 8 hours 
Max Fonnesbeck 8 hours 
This documentary evidence indisputably estab-
lishes falsification of payroll records for the benefit of 
Don Chiodo by Vincent Chiodo personally or pursuant 
to his instructions. Although the trial court refused tu 
amend the findings of fact prepared by plaintiff's 
counsel, it did tacitly determine that this payroll fraud 
was engaged in by Vincent Chiodo when it said (R. 
592): 
" ... but there's always padding in these cost-
plus deals, and when Mr. Chiodo took over this 
company he was living in these surroundings, and 
these parties must have envisaged moonlight op-
erations, as we call it, double work contracts and 
all kinds of unorthodox employment practices." 
In addition to the payroll padding and falsification 
of payroll records for Don Chiodo, Vincent Chiodo also 
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permitted his sons, Don and Gene Chiodo, to receive 
monetary benefits for work done by Bear River Tele-
phone Company employees on Bear River Telephone 
Company time for work that was ostensibly under 
contract to .lVIax Fonnesbeck. 
The evidence establishes that Don and Gene Chiodo 
were paid the following amounts in connection with 
contracts let by Bear River Telephone Company to 
Max Fonnesbeck: 
Exhibit Record Don Gene 
Date No. Ref. Chiodo Chiodo 
7/19/61 55 219 $ 300.00 $ 
912/61 229-230 2,000.00 
1129/62 96 284 300.00 
1/31162 62 232 l,000.00 
5/5/62 63 232 400.00 
3/20/62 75 237-238 3,060.00 
715162 97 284 165.00 
8122 02 98 284 270.00 
12122/62 284 
$3,700.00 $4,795.00 
The evidence to support the claim that Don and 
Gene Chiodo were obtaining benefits through the use of 
Bear River Telephone Company employees on Bear 
HiYer Telephone Company time requires a study of the 
testimony arnl the exhibits introduced beginning on 
page Hl9 of the record and concluding on page 495. 
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This evidence shows that Vincent Chiodo's sons 
did do some of the work on the contracts in question 011 
their own time when they were not being paid directly 
by Bear River Telephone Company .. Max Fonnesbeck 
and another subcontractor of Max Fonnesbeck, Grant 
Allred, did perform portions of such contracts on their 
own time and by use of their own employees. However, 
the record is clear that some employees of the Bear Rirer 
Telephone Company were used by Vincent Chiodo's 
sons on regular company time to perform work which 
Vincent Chiodo's sons had subcontracted on a fixed fee 
basis and from which they profited at the expense of 
Bear River Telephone Company. 
Jerry Jones (R. 362-370), Steve Anderson (R. 
353-359), Richard Clark ( R. 346-348), and Da vicl Scott 
(R. 335-339) all testified that they had performed work 
on regular time and while being paid by Bear River 
Telephone Company which work had been identified 
by Mr. Allred and Mr. Fonnesbeck as work covered by 
contracts let to Fonnesbeck and which Fonnesbeck hnd 
subcontracted in part to Don Chiodo or Gene Chiodo 
either directly or through Grant Allred. David Scott 
( R. 334-335) and Richard Clark ( R. 344-345) both 
testified that they saw splicing being done on a Max 
Fonnesbeck contract by other Bear River Telephone 
Company employees while they were working for Bear 
River Telephone Company during regular compauy 
working hours. 
Steve Anderson testified that he had personall~· 
assisted Don Chiodo periodically over a period of three 
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or four months on Bear River Telephone Company time 
in splicing an installation of telephone cable at Thiokol 
(R. 355) and this particular telephone cable was in-
i stalled under contract by l\Iax Fonnesbeck ( Exs. 57 and 
58) which Fonnesbeck had subcontracted to Don Chiodo 
(R. 230, 242). Jerry Jones testified that he had per-
sonally installed on Bear River Telephone Company 
time some of the equipment in the Tremonton addition 
(R. '362-366), the installation of which was nominally 
under contract to l\1ax Fonnesbeck but which was totally 
subcontracted to Grant Allred and Gene Chiodo ( R. 
202-204). 
Additional evidence of this practice of payroll 
padding and fraud against Bear River Telephone Com-
pany was a payment of $354.20 (Ex. 109) to Vincent 
Chiodo's 14-year-old granddaughter ( R. 468-470) for 
the purported delivery of Bear River Telephone Com-
pany directories when, in fact, Don Chiodo handled the 
delivery of these directories, in part at least, on regular 
company time ( R. 488) . 
The facts relating to this specific breach are clearly 
established and the law is also clear in permitting an 
employer under such circumstances rightfully to termi-
nate the employment of the agent. 
This brief could be terminated at this point as to 
point II of the argument but there are many additional 
breaches of contract by Vincent Chiodo which are mate-
rial and support the defendant's claim of rightful dis-
l'harge. 
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B. Insubordination. 
Comment ( b) under section 387 of Restatemen/, 
Agency, states: 
"b. Scope of duty. The agent's duty is not onlr 
to act solely for the benefit of the principal i;t 
matters entrusted to him (see § § 388-392), but 
also to take no unfair advantage of his position 
in the use of information or things acquired bv 
him because of his position as agent or becaus·e 
of the opportunities which his position affords. 
See § § 393-398. The agent is also under a dutr 
not to act or speak disloyally in matters which 
are connected with his employment except in 
the protection of his own interests or those of 
others. He is not, however, necessarily prevented 
from acting in good faith outside his employment 
in a manner which injuriously affects his prin-
cipal's business. His duties of loyalty to the 
interests of his principal are the same as those 
of a trustee to his beneficiaries. See the Restate-
ment of Trusts, § 170." 
Section 385, Restatement, Agency, states: 
"Duty to Obey. 
(I) Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is sub 
ject to a duty to obey all .reasonable directions 
in regard to the manner of performing a service 
that he has contracted to perform. 
( 2) Unless he is privileged to protect his mm 
or another's interest, an agent is subject to a duty 
not to act in matters entrusted to him on account 
of the principal contrary to the directions of 
the principal, even though the terms of the cm· 
ployment prescribe that such directions shall 11ot 
be given." 
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'fhe record of this case establishes that Vincent 
Chiodo was disobedient, insolent, disrespectful and un-
faithful to his employer's interests and that he com-
municated his insolence and disrespect to employees of 
Bear River Telephone Company. As early as January 
6, HHH, about two weeks after he sold his Bear River 
Telephone Company stock, Vincent Chiodo began mak-
ing complaints to Mr. A. "'\V. Sanders, the Executive 
Yice President of Bear River Telephone Company 
(Ex. 22). 
In April 1961, Vincent Chiodo was directed to 
contact a .Mr. Brough, an insurance agent, and cancel 
an insurance policy because the company could effect 
a sayings of 32 per cent by use of a blanket policy which 
was used to insure affiliated companies (Ex. 30) .. Mr. 
Chiodo was told (Ex. 30) : 
"I am quite sure that you can properly explain 
the Company's position in this matter to Mr. 
Brough, and ask that you do so. We are trying 
hard to assist you as much as possible on every 
day matters at Tremonton. Matters such as this 
make me wonder if we are receiving your 100% 
co-opera ti on.'' 
In reply to this directive Vincent Chiodo simply 
refused to comply and wrote Mr. Sanders (Ex. 31) 
telling Mr. Sanders about Vincent Chiodo's gripes and 
finally saying: 
"I am returning herewith all papers pertain-
ing to your deal with :Mr. Brough, you can dis-
pose of it as you see fit." 
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The policy of insurance in question was a policy 
on the properties of Bear River Telephone Companv 
and was an ordinary insurance policy which had bee;i 
awarded Mr. Brough on the basis of bids submitted to 
Bear River Telephone Company by various insurance 
companies (Ex. 31). 
Rather than follow his orders Vincent Chiodo be-
came rebellious and considered the matter as his personal 
business rather than the company's business. In response 
to questions concerning this insubordination, Vincent 
Chiodo testified as follows ( R. 570) : 
"Q And you got along beautifully with l\Ir. 
Sanders too? 
"A Yes, we did. 
"Q Well, in evidence is a letter chastising you 
about this Brough insurance matter in April of 
1961; isn't that true? 
"A The odd thing-yes, that's true. 
"Q All right. And isn't it true that you in the 
course of that disobeyed a direct order from Mr. 
Sanders. He told you to cancel out with Mr. 
Brough and you refused to do so and told him 
to do it himself? 
"A I do not break contracts with any man. He 
asked me to break by solemn word, and I won't 
do it for anybody. 
"Q But you did disobey a direct order from l\lr. 
Sanders? 
"A If that is an order, I disobeyed it. yes." 
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Vincent Chiodo wrote Donald Bell, Sanders' suc-
cessor, the following concerning Vice President Hansen 
(Ex. 29): 
"After you read these please destroy them. 
I think that the Letter of April 25, 1961 is 
enough to hang both Hansen and Anderson. 
As I see it however, Anderson was a tool of 
Hansen. 
"If you have trouble hanging Hansen, let me 
know and I'll come out and do the job myself." 
rincent Chiodo also wrote .Mr. Sanders about .Mr. 
Hansen (Ex. 27) : 
"Your attention is directed to the problem of 
providing a licensed engineer. As you know Mr. 
John Swenson was hired as a temporary opera-
tor until VICE PRESIDENT HANSON 
had time to make permanent arrangements. Un-
less provision is made at this time for an orderly 
replacement of Mr. Swenson at the time that he 
leaves school, the operation of the Microwave at 
Promontory will be in jeopardy. 
"Please be advised that the Collins microwave 
engineerd (sic) by Vice President Hanson is 
not performing properly. This matter has been 
called to your attention on at least one occasion 
previously, but no remedial action has been 
taken." 
'Vhen inquiry was made by Mr. Cornwell, a staff 
officer of the New London off ice, 1 regarding the billing 
cif Bear River Telephone Company subscriber, Vincent 
! New London was the headquarters for all of the telephone 
companies owned by General Waterworks Corporation, includ-
ing Bear River Telephone Company. 
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Chiodo took it upon himself not only to castigate l\Ir. 
Cornwell, but to carry his displeasure not to his superior 
officer, lVIr. Sanders, but to the president of the com. 
pany, Mr. Butcher, who had no function whatever as to 
the daily operational problems of Bear River Telephone 
Company. In addition, Vincent Chiodo also sent a copy 
of his letter to the billing agent of Bear River Telephone 
Company in Provo, Utah, who had no bona fide interest 
whatever in the internal operations of Bear River Tele-
phone Company. The letter (Ex. 24) states: 
"This is in reply to your letter dated 4-1-63 
to DHI Computing Service, Provo, Utah. Please 
be advised that the contract for DHI was be-
tween Vincent Chiodo and Bliss Crandall and 
has nothing to do with you. Therefore please stop 
bothering Mr. Crandall. . . . 
• 
"This property was sold to General "\Vater-
works with the provision that I was to manage 
it. I intend to run this plant in accordance with 
my agreement with Mr. Butcher. In the mean· 
time if you have any questions you will contact 
me. Under no condition are you to contact my 
people." 
On numerous occasions Vincent Chiodo would indi-
cate to the Bear River Telephone Company employees 
that his superior officers didn't know what they were 
doing and were incompetent to manage the Bear River 
Telephone Company (R. 316, 425). In June 1963, 
Vincent Chiodo told Don Korth that he (Viucent 
Chiodo) "should not have to request authority from 
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people like him (Dick Hansen) who were incompetent 
and not telephone men" (R. 316). He also frequently 
directed the Bear River Telephone Company employees 
to keep the officers of the company in the dark and not 
to send them anything which was not specifically asked 
for (R. 319-324, 326, 393-400). He advised the em-
. ployees that there was going to be a court battle over 
his contract as early as six months after the sale (R. 
322-324, 326). Vincent Chiodo also told Mr. Sam 
'Varner, another employee of Bear River Telephone 
Company, in late 1961 or early 1962 that he (Vincent 
Chiodo) believed (R. 489) : 
"that New London was trying everything 
they could to get him to resign from his position 
as manager, and that he would not resign regard-
less of what they did." 
He also told .Mr. Warner ( R. 489) "that he would do 
everything he could legally to get himself discharged." 
This may account for the obvious insolence and dis-
respect demonstrated continually by Vincent Chiodo in 
his correspondence to the head office in New London. 
Some of the more obvious of Vincent Chiodo's insub-
ordinations, which are documented, are set forth above. 
The full flavor of Vincent Chiodo's disobedience, in-
solence and disrespect can be better appreciated b~, a 
review of all the pertinent exhibits. The exhibits which 
are particularly pertinent to this point are numbers 
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
42, 43, 44, and 46. 
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C. Disclosure of Confidential Information. 
Restatement, Agency, Section 395, states as fol-
lows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject 
to a duty to the principal not to use or to com-
municate information confidentially given him 
by the principal or acquired by him during the 
course of or on account of his agency or in vio-
lation of his duties as agent, in competition with 
or to the injury of the principal, on his own 
account or on behalf of another, although such 
information does not relate to the transaction 
in which he is then employed, unless the informa-
tion is a matter of general knowledge." 
On July 31, 1961, Vincent Chiodo was informed 
of pending negotiations with Mountain States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company for the exchange of the 
Bear River Telephone Company properties. Vincent 
Chiodo was informed of this matter in his official capac-
ity as manager of Bear River Telephone Company. 
Mr. Chiodo in his letter of August 4, 1961, directed to 
Mr. Harold F. Clark, Director, Western Area Tele-
phone REA, recognizes that he was instructed to keep 
this matter secret. He said (Ex. 23, p. 3): 
"Mr. Sanders has asked me not to make this 
action public but I can see no reason for not ad-
vising you and the commission people." 
In direct and flagrant violation of his orders, Vin-
cent Chiodo sent letters to the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah and to the REA. Copies of the letter~ 
forwarded to the Public Service Commission are Exhibit 
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~:1 in this case. The absolute refusal of Vincent Chiodo 
to follow orders cannot be more manifest than in the 
letters sent to the Public Service Commission (Ex. 23). 
In an effort to excuse his disobedience Vincent 
Chiodo testified that he felt that he was justified in 
making such disclosures because he, Vincent Chiodo, 
had sold the company and certain representations were 
made as to what General Waterworks Corporation was 
going to do. His excuses were as follows ( R. 563-564) : 
"Q I'll ask you this. Had you discussed, prior 
to the sale, with myself, with R.E.A. and with 
the Public Service Commission the purpose-no; 
what General 'Vaterworks was going to do so 
far as holding this company for operation or 
taking it for investment? 
"A I had even gone further. I had discussed 
in detail practically all of the terms that are in 
our August third transcript with all members of 
the Utah Public Service Commission, including 
engineer Wilford Robinson. I had forwarded 
that same information to the chief of the western 
area for R.E.A. They had approved of my sale, 
as it were, on that basis, and the sale was at that 
time interpreted as being to a company that was 
going to operate the property and not buying 
it for speculation. 
"Q And you went to them and told them that 
this no longer held good? 
"A Yes, I told them I was terribly surprised, 
that I had not meant to lie to them originally. 
I was taken by surprise. 
"Q Now we've got evidence in here where I 
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wrote to Mr. Sanders and then Mr. Sanders 
wrote back to you upbraiding you for having 
discussed it. 
"A Yes." 
It is clear that Vincent Chiodo was not concerned 
about what the company's shareholders and directors 
desired for the company, he was only concerned about 
himself. The attempt to justify himself by his assump-
tion that the purchase of Bear River Telephone Com-
pany by General Waterworks Corporation was ap-
proved because of Vincent Chiodo's representations as 
to the purpose of General Waterworks Corporation is 
patently absurd and merely makes his disobedience more 
palpable. His own testimony is conclusive (R. 42): 
"Q Why did you go to the Public Service Com· 
mission? 
"A Why didn't I go-
"Q Why did you? 
"A Well, I was seeking advice on what to do 
to look after my own interests in this matter." 
(Emphasis added). 
It was immediately after this meeting in Denver 
that Vincent Chiodo declared war on Bear River Tele-
phone Company and did everything in his power to 
cause trouble and problems for the company. 
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D. Disloyalty. 
Restatement, Agency, Section 391, states as fol-
lows: 
"Acting for Adverse Party without Princi-
pal's Consent 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject 
to a duty to his principal not to act on behalf 
of an adverse party in a transaction connected 
with his agency without the principal's knowl-
d 
,, 
e ge. 
Also, Section 394, Restatement, Agency, provides: 
"Acting for One with Conflicting Interests 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject 
to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the 
period of his agency for persons whose interests 
conflict with those of the principal in matters 
in which the agent is employed." 
During September and October of 1962, Vincent 
Chiodo contacted Mr. Elwood A. Crandall of the J. A. 
Hogle Company for the purpose of acting as an un-
disclosed agent of a prospective purchaser of Bear River 
Telephone Company from its principal owner, General 
Waterworks Corporation. This entire negotiation was 
carried out at a time when Vincent Chiodo owed the 
highest duty of fidelity and trust to the stockholders of 
Bear River Telephone Company as he was both an 
officer and director of the Bear River Telephone Com-
pany. See, e.g., Elggren v. Wooley, 64 Utah 183, 228 
Pac. 906 (1924); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Pack 
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Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 ( ID31). 
Mr. Crandall testified as follows (R. 134) : 
"l.VIr. Chiodo said that he believed General 
'Vaterworks would sell the company back to him 
and that if he could buy it he would in turn sell 
it to Independent Telephone. That he would 
charge no fee in the process, or markup. He 
asked that we not advise General \Vaterworks 
that he was acting in this capacity. He suggested 
that we contact l\1r. Rampton and work with 
him in contacting General Waterworks." 
Although Vincent Chiodo's efforts to obtain the 
stock of his employer for the benefit of an undisclosed 
third party were not successful, it is not the success or 
failure which determines the breach but the Yiolation 
of the duty of loyalty as stated in Comment on Subsec-
tion (1) to Section 409, Restatement, Agency, para-
graph (b): 
"A wilful disobedience or a violation of duty 
of loyalty may constitute a material breaeh o.f 
contract although the harm likely to arise frmr. 
such breach is very small." 
E. Failure to Render Proper Accounts. 
Restatement, Agency, Section 382, states as fol-
lows: 
"Duty to Keep and Render Accounts 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject 
to a duty to keep, and render to his prineipaL 
an account of money or other things whieh he 
has received or paid out on behalf ()f the prin-
cipal." 
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In violation of his duty to properly account for 
funds belonging to Bear River Telephone Company, 
Vincent Chiodo deliberately failed to collect proper 
charges from customers because of his personal feud 
with his superiors in the home office. 
Mr. Sam Warner testified that certain charges for 
some "watts band service" should have been made to 
Thiokol in June 1963. Vincent Chiodo instructed him 
that any inquiry on these charges should be referred 
directly to Vincent Chiodo and Mr. Warner was to 
communicate nothing to the New London office ( R. 
439). ,.,.incent Chiodo further instructed 1.\fr. 'Varner, 
after seYeral months, to prepare the correct bill so that 
New London would not know what was being done 
(R. 443): 
"Q Now in connection with these offsetting en-
tries, did Mr. Chiodo made (sic) any statement 
concerning the way that these two things should 
be reported? 
"A Yes, he said to make them up on one sheet 
or one charge or one credit, whichever way you 
would like to put it, that the-he said to put 
them on one page so that they wouldn't know 
they were being-by 'they' I mean New Lon-
don-that New London would not know whether 
Thiokol was being charged for the additional 
services or being given credit for them." 
In addition, Vincent Chiodo told Mr. 'Varner that 
he (Vincent Chiodo) and Warner had no responsibility 
to make correct charges because New London could 
1 figure it out themselves ( R. 444) : 
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"A He said that New London had all the figures 
that we have, that they received all the papers 
from .Mountain States Telephone Companv that 
we do, they receive a copy of our reveni.{e di~­
tribution, and if they can't figure out that they 
are losing or making money from those figure~, 
that that was their fault, that it didn't mean 
anything to us here." 
There were also some charges for advertising in 
telephone directories which Yincent Chiodo refused to 
bill to Bear River Telephone Company customers. The 
failure to make these charges were brought to Yincent 
Chiodo's attention on "at least three occasions" (R. 444) 
by Mr. 'Varner and Mr. Chiodo told him that it was 
not the responsibility of the Tremonton off ice to adYise 
the main office. .Mr. \Varner testified that ( R. 445): 
"A l\'Ir. Chiodo said that New London had 
exactly the same papers that we had, they had 
the bill from l\'Iountain States Telephone Com-
pany which showed the amount that we were 
being charged, they also had our revenue distri-
bution which showed the amount that we were 
billing our customers, and that if they couldn't 
pick the fact that they were losing money, tlieE 
it was not up to us to tell them, that as long as 
we were getting our money and doing our "·ork, 
he didn't care." 
F. Failure to Communicate Information. 
Section 381, Restatement, Agency, states: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is s.uhjed 
to a dutv to use reasonable efforts to gm" h:s 
principal information which is relevant to affair.~ 
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entrusted to him and which, as the agent has 
notice, the principal would desire to have and 
which can be communicated without violating a 
superior duty to a third person." 
Also, Section 383, Restaternent, Agency, states: 
"Except when he is privileged to protect his 
own or another's interests, an agent is subject 
to a duty to the principal not to act in the prin-
cipal's affairs except in accordance with the 
principal's manifestation of consent." 
In Comment ( e) to Section 383 it states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
"Acts for which agent is liable. The agent 
may be subject to liability to his principal be-
cause he has made an unauthorized contract for 
which his principal is liable (see sections 159-
178, 194-202); ... " 
In viola ti on of his duty properly to inform his 
employer and not to enter into agreements in violation 
of law without the consent of Bear River Telephone 
Company, Vincent Chiodo did direct two employees 
improperly to report overtime work in violation of the 
federal \Vage and Hour laws. 
By letter of July 22, 1963 (Ex. 35), Vincent Chiodo 
represented to Mr. Bell, the Vice President and General 
Manager of Bear River Telephone Company, that em-
ployees 'Varner and Staples were being paid overtime 
to do certain janitorial and automotive repair work. As 
a matter of fact these men were not being paid at over-
time rates but were in fact being paid less than straight 
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time rates . .Further, they were reporting their time al 
Vincent Chiodo's direction so that the federal \Vage and 
Hours examiners would not be able to detect the false 
reporting. .Mr. \Varner testified that Yinceut Chiodo 
had given him directions as to how his time was tu he 
reported and further testified ( R. 446) : 
"A He told me that I was to show hvo hours 
on my time sheet for every three hours that J 
worked at the janitor job. 
"Q Did he say ai1ything further about the rate 
of pay or anything of that nature? 
"A Nothing more about the rate of pay. 
"Q Did he say anything else that you can re-
call? 
"A He said that if anyone should ever ques-
tion the time that I put on the time sheet for the 
janitor's job, that I was to tell no one anything. 
that it was strictly between him and myself." 
.Mr. Staples also testified that Yincent Chiodo had in-
structed him as to his time reporting so no questions 
would arise with regard to the \Vage and Hour laws 
(R. 428): 
"Q \Vhat did he (Vincent Chiodo) say! 
"A He said I was to report my time so that it 
would figure out at two dollars an hour so that 
there wouldn't be any question with the hour 
and wage law. 
"Q \Vhat was your regular rate of pay at tlia1 
time? 
"A Approximately two-fifty an hour. 
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"Q Then how would you report your time, for 
example if you spent three hours doing extra 
work? How would this appear on your time 
record, in addition to an eight hour day? 
"A This would show two hours." 
III. THE GROUNDS STATED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR REFUSING JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DE-
SPITE ITS PROOF OF GOOD CAUSE ARE 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
After hearing the evidence and receiving volumi-
nous briefs by the parties, the trial court on June 15, 
1965, announced its ruling (R. 589, et. seq.) and the 
reasons therefor. It is submitted that the ruling based 
upon these reasons is in error and the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law prepared by counsel for plaintiff 
and adopted by the court should be set aside and judg-
ment entered for defendant. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Deciding That The Moral 
Standards of the Community Were So Low As To Excuse The 
Actions of Vincent Chiodo. 
From the District Court's opinion, it is clear that 
the court was convinced that the activities of Vincent 
Chiodo set forth in the statement of facts and point II 
of the argument did in fact occur. The court said (R. 
591-592, 596-597) : 
"Now the record is quite meager on the sur-
rounding circumstances in the broad sense of 
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the word at the time these negotiations 011 the 
contract were going on, but the court can't oYer-
look the fact-and l guess it's common knowl-
edge; the court will take notice of the proposi-
tion that there was a giant rocket facility beino 
• M 
placed in here on a cost-plus program, which in 
the court's view was one of the most wasteful 
ways of spending the taxpayers' money that the 
court knows anything about. Now it's true in 
time of war or stress that cost-plus contracts 
are indulged in, but in time of peace when ~ 
giant cost-plus facility is placed in a conununity 
it immediately sets into motion great inflation. 
And the only reason, this is material here, gentle-
men-I'm not launching on an attack on gor-
ernment policy, but at the time these negotiation.) 
were going on it's common knowledge that the 
great inflation was taking place in this com-
munity. This cost-plus facility out here was 
being operated in the great American custom, 
and the great American custom calls, of course, 
in the court's view, and I'm not picking 011 Thio-
kol Chemical as against the other, but there's 
always padding in these cost-plus deals. arnl 
when l\1r. Chiodo took over this company he wtiS 
living in these surroundings, and these partie~ 
must have envisaged moonlight operations, as we 
call it, double work contracts and all kinds of 
unorthodox employment practices. 
"Now as a matter of New Englarnl honesty 
the court can't uphold all of these what I call 
somewhat minor acts of J\1r. Chiodo, hut con-
sidering his surroundings and the inflation and 
the padding and the purchase orders and all of 
this other business going on around her~. I li,e 
court can't convince itself that ~Ir- Chiodo:> 
conduct was sufficient to justif~· his disl'hargl'. 
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That's all I'm leading up to. I'm not making 
any attack on the Thiokol Chemical Company 
as such. If there's to be any attack it should be 
on the government itself for permitting such 
contract practices." 
. . . 
" ... Now professionally, gentlemen, the court 
hangs its hat on three propositions: .First, that 
this contract has a-I don't want to use the word 
'loophole', but the contract refers to another 
agreement and undertaking, and that in the 
court's view that's sufficient to permit the court 
to look behind the contract. Second, that the 
parties by their practical interpretation of the 
contract have construed it under the plaintiff's 
theory of the case. Now, of course, that's a ques-
tion of fact. Third, the court finds and concludes 
that, while the plaintiff's conduct has certainly 
not been lilywhite, considering the Sodom and 
Gomorrah community that he was working in 
at that time, I'm not going to charge him with 
such a serious violation in the light of the sur-
rounding circumstances and surrounding meth-
ods of operation so as to justify discharge. Now 
I may be wrong; I've been wrong before; but 
I'm hangmg my hat on those three propositions." 
There are no decided cases (which have come to 
defendant's attention) which would indicate that an 
employer cannot rightfully discharge a dishonest em-
ployee who permits and participates in payroll padding, 
is disobedient of employer's instructions and orders, is 
insolent and disrespectful and is unfaithful to his em-
1 ployer's interest because the moral standards of the 
r community have been depressed to such a point that 
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"moonlight operations ... double work contracts a1Hl 
all kinds of unorthodox employment practices" ( H. ti0:2 1 
are commonplace giving the community a "Sodom and 
Gomorrah" ( R. 596) atmosphere. Aside from the bet 
that the law does not condone improper conduct hy an 
employee - even though the community practices are 
at that low level - there is no evidence in the record 
to sustain the District Court's conclusion relative to such 
moral standards. If the moral standards of the com-
munity are supposed to permit the kinds of actiYities 
engaged in by Vincent Chiodo, then it should appear 
from witnesses acquainted with such standards and not 
by the court's ipse dixit. 
Section 78-25-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets 
forth those matters as to which a court may take judicial 
notice. There is nothing in this statute which would per-
mit a court to take judicial notice of the effect of the 
establishment of government defense installations in 
Box Elder County on the moral standards of busines~;­
men in the area. If the actual status of the comm11niti"s 
moral standards is relevant to the ~termination of the 
issues of this case, and we submit that it is not, the trial 
court should have required plaintiff to offer eYidenec in 
support of this excuse for his breaches of contract and 
permitted defendant to offer rebuttal evidence. The 
court in order to justify its conclusion in this case mmt 
have concluded and should have made a finding that the 
employment agreement between Bear River Tckph"1w 
Company and Chiodo was entered into in light of tlir 
claimed low moral standards in the Box E Ider ( \ iw it.' 
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community, and that Chiodo was not expected to meas-
ure up to any higher standard. To so conclude in the 
absence of any evidence on the point is to compound the 
i ~ourt's error. 
A telephone company is a public utility. Its rates 
and standards of service are supervised and regulated 
by the Public Service Commission of Utah. It is an 
invasion of that Commission's prerogatives for the trial 
court to assume that Chiodo and the Bear River Tele-
, phone Company would contract for a standard of con-
1 duct of its manager which would inflate the Company's 
costs and affect materially the quality of its services. 
If the federal government and its taxpayers were fair 
game for the citizens of Box Elder County because of 
the government contract with Thiokol as the trial court 
apparently assumed, does that mean that the stock-
holders of Bear River Telephone Company and the 
users of the Bear River Telephone Company service 
were equally fair game for the local manager of Bear 
River Telephone Company? 
The record is clear that the trial court refused to 
find justification for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo 
because of its belief that the community morals from 
1960 to 1963 permitted such conduct and not because 
the court had concluded that the various actions claimed 
by defendant to have been engaged in by Vincent Chiodo 
had not in fact occurred. Defendant specifically re-
(1uested the court to set forth the facts relative to Vincent 
1 Chiodo's conduct (R. 674-677) but the court merely 
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denied defendant's motion and did not make any spcc1hc 
finding of fact relative to the actions of \Tincent Cliio:[1, 
'l'he effect of this determination is that in the trial court, 
opinion it makes no difference \vhether such acts were 11 r 
were not engaged in by Vincent Chiodo because, a~ a 
matter of law, these acts do not constitute sufficient 
justification to permit Bear River Telephone Company 
rightfully to discharge Vincent Chiodo. In this the tri;ii 
court erred. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Deciding That Bear River 
Telephone Company Could Not Rightfully Discharge Vincent 
Chiodo Because of The Acceptance of His Activities Over The 
Three Year Period. 
The trial court in its opinion said ( R. 590-591) : 
"There's one other thing that's persuasive to 
the court in this matter, and that is the interpre-
tation given by the parties on this exhibit six 
during the three years that lVIr. Chiodo operated 
this company and the practice of the partirs 
lends itself to the proposition that ~Ir. Chio<lu 
was to be in practically absolute charge of this 
Bear River Telephone Company during this 
period of time. It's true that he was depriYed of 
the right to sign checks by a resolutio11. bttt that 
had nothing to do with the main operation of 
the company. 
"So the court finds as a fact that the partih 
did interpret the contract as indicated 11\ tlic 
court by their conduct." 
The court by this reference appears to he ti11di1 1g 
that while Vincent Chiodo did the things wh1rli dcfrn 
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dant claims he did the defendant cannot rightfully dis-
charge him, because by failing to discharge him sooner 
the defendant has in effect condoned his actions. The 
authorities do not sustain this interpretation and the trial 
court erred in its conclusion that by suffering through 
three years of intolerable insolent and disrespectful 
activity by Vincent Chiodo, Bear River Telephone Com-
pany became estopped from doing anything other than 
continuing his pay for the balance of the contract period. 
The Restaternent, Agency, sets forth several spe-
cific duties of an agent, the breach of which will justify 
the agent's discharge and the comments on Section 409, 
Subsection (2) in paragraph (g) makes it clear that 
while a material breach may be condoned to the extent 
the employer elects not to discharge the agent for the 
breach, such breach will still furnish justification for dis-
charge of the employee for subsequent other breaches 
which taken alone would not justify his discharge. 
"g. Effect of condonation. If the principal 
elects not to discharge the agent for a material 
breach of contract, such breach is not of itself 
a cause of future discharge. If, however, the 
agent commits a subsequent breach of duty too 
small in itself to constitute a cause for dismissal, 
the prior breach of duty may be considered, so 
that, because of the two, the principal may he 
privileged to discharge the agent. In no event, 
however, does the principal's condonation of 
previous conduct by the agent relieve the agent 
from liability for damages caused by his breach 
of duty, unless the principal has so contracted 
or the agent has changed his position in reliance 
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upon an agreement with the principal not ti, 
take action upon it." 
Comments on Section 4<09, Subsection ( 2), paragrapli 
(e) of the Restatemenl, Agency, make it clear that ! 
the principal need not have actual knowledge of the ' 
agent's breach at the time the agent is discharged 111 
order for the discharge to be justified: 
"e. Principal's knowledge of breach. If a priu-
cipal has cause for the discharge of an agent and 
discharges him, the fact that the principal is 110\ 
at the time aware that he has cause for discharge 
is immaterial. See the Restatement of Contracts. 
§ 278. If, under such circumstances, the prin-
cipal were to compensate the agent for the sup-
posed breach of the employment contract in dis-
charging the agent, the principal would be en-
titled to restitution. See the Restatement of 
Restitution, § 18. 
Illustration: 
"5. A, who has been employed by P for a 
period of one year, is discharged by P on the 
alleged ground that A is performing his duties 
in an unsatisfactory manner. This is not true: 
P is satisfied with A's services. The cause for 
discharge is a dimunition in P's business. Cn-
known to P, A has embezzled from him. A !ms 
no cause of action against P for his <lisclwrge. 
"6. Same facts as in Illustration 5, except 
that at the time of discharge P paid A $1,0011 
to compensate A. P is entitled to reeover l1ack 
this amount." 
Section 278 of Restatement, Contracts ( rn22). als11 
makes it clear that actual knowledge of a breach al tilt 
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time of the discharge is immaterial in order to justify 
the discharge: 
"Promisor's Ignorance of :Facts That 'Vould 
Operate As a Discharge. 
"The failure of a condition to exist or to occur 
or the actual or prospective failure to perform a 
return promise which would prevent a promisor's 
duty from arising or would discharge it if he 
knew of the facts, has the same effect although 
he is ignorant of them." 
While the trial court seems to have found that the Hear 
River Telephone Company accepted Chiodo's interpre-
tation of the employment agreement as being modified 
by the Logan transcript (Ex. I), giving Chiodo con-
siderable latitude in his discretion as manager, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that Bear River Tele-
phone Company interpreted the contract as so modified 
to allow Mr. Chiodo to be disloyal, disrespectful or dis-
honest or condoned such actions. 
IV. THE El\.1PLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
~IAY NOT BE VARIED BY PAROL EVI-
DENCE; AND EVEN IF SUCH PAROL EVI-
DENCE IS ADMITTED, THERE IS N0-
1 THING IN THE PAROL EVIDENCE OF-
. FERED 'VHICH \VOULD MAKE THE CON-
TRACT HERE IN QUESTION A CON-
TRACT WHICH CANNOT BE TERMI-
XATED FOR JUST CAUSE. 
In points I to III, supra, it has been assumed, 
arguendo, that the employment contract here in question 
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could be varied by the parol evidence introduce<l Li 
plaintiff relative to the negotiations leading up to tl;t 
written contract. It is submitted, however, that the trial 
court was correct when it first ruled that parol evidence 
could not be introduced to vary this contract (R. J84, 
and not, when it later ruled that the contract could he 
varied by parol. The court said ( R. 584) : 
"THE COURT: '\Tell, if you're going to 
assert there's some parol understanding as part 
of that written contract - in other words, if 
you're going to claim there's an exception to the 
parol evidence rule-
" MR. W ATKISS: I'm not going to brief 
you any more on that. I've given it to you. 
"THE COURT: 'Vell, you haven't given me 
any law on it. 
"1.HR. \VATKISS: Yes, I have. My last 
brief has maybe four or five cases and restate· 
ments and otherwise. 
"THE COURT: I'm still not sold now-uow 
that we got over the threshold and we've got •t 
written contract now, the court is not solrl that 
there are any exceptions to the pnrol evidence 
rule involved here." 
The court apparently changed its mind on this point 
because it later said (R. 589) : 
"Gentlemen, the plaintiff may prevail in thi~ 
action. The court feels impelled to state its rea· 
sons and to make some discussion in this ca~e. 
First of all, looking at the contract between the 
defendant, Bear River Telephone, and tl1e plnn1- 1 
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tiff, there's a phrase in that contract which in 
the court's view permits it to examine into and 
scrutinize the prior negotiations and prior agree-
ments between the parties. That's the first phrase 
in paragraph three, which reads, 'In accordance 
with the understanding and agreement which we 
have arrived at.' Then as we all know, the letter 
goes on to recite certain specific things. Now it's 
this court's view that that phrase is the 'Open 
Sesame' that permits this examination, and but 
for that perhaps the court couldn't look at or 
examine or consider these prior negotiations and 
the interview in the Eccles Hotel which was taken 
down by the reporter, and the letter, even the 
letter of Mr. Sanders, if it was the letter, which 
enclosed this letter contract, as well as the tele-
gram. " 
If the written agreement cannot be varied by parol 
then the law clearly permits Bear River Telephone Com-
pany to terminate Chiodo's employment on any one of 
the grounds it established; and Bear River Telephone 
Company need not assume the additional burden of 
proof which it did assume for purposes of the argument 
in points I to III. 
It is not practical in this brief to explore in depth 
the parol evidence rule. The text writers, when discuss-
ing this rule, generally hasten to poip.t out that it is 
! a rule of substantive law and is not a rule of evidence. 
In Section 573 of 3 Corbin on Contracts ( 1960) it 
states: 
"'Vhen two parties have made a contract and 
have expressed it in a writing to which they have 
both assented as the complete and accurate in-
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tegration of that contract, evidence, whether 
parol or otherwise, of antecedent understa11di11 ,,1 ' 
and negotiations will not be admitted for tht 
purpose of varying or contradicting the writi11 ,,. 
This is in substance what is called the 'par~I ' . 
evidence rule,' a rule that scarcely deserves to 
be called a rule of evidence of any kind, and a 1 
rule that is as truly applicable to written eri- 1 
dance as to parol evidence. The use of such a 
name for this rule has had unfortunate conse-
quences, principally by distracting the attention 
from the real issues that are involved. These 
issues may be any one or more of the following: 
(I) have the parties made a contract? ( 2) Is 
that contract void or voidable because of illegal-
ity, fraud, mistake, or any other reason 1 ( :3) Did 
the parties assent to a particular writing as the 
complete and accurate 'integration' of that con-
tract? " 
It was not contended by Vincent Chiodo that the 
parties did not enter into the written employment con-
tract nor that the contract is void or voidable because of 
illegality, fraud or mistake. It is difficult to determine 
whether Vincent Chiodo contends that the oral comer-
sation of August 3, 1960 (Ex. I) is itself a separate 
contract or whether he claims that the contract actual!~· 
entered into (Ex. 6) should be amended to include this 
transcript. Apparently, the trial court has concluder! 
that the employment contract should be amended to in 
elude Exhibit 1 as part of the terms of the employment 
agreement. 
Exhibit 1 may not be considered by the Court for 
the purpose of varying or interpreting the agrecmc1ir 
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where there is no claim of fraud or mistake of fact in 
' the execution of the contract. The Utah Supreme Court 
, in Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 
, 25 P.2d 952, 956, stated: 
"The appellant thus first urges that the testi-
monv of any such oral agreement was received 
in vfolation of the parol evidence rule. That the 
deed on its face is a completed contract and the 
contract and the terms and subject-matter there-
of fully and completely stated free from uncer-
tainty or ambiguity is not disputed. No claim 
is made of any fraud, misrepresentation, acci-
dent, or mistake of fact in the execution of the 
deed. The action is not laid nor did it proceed 
on any such theory. All that also is true and 
admitted as to the written agreement executed 
by the parties January 22, 1924, heretofore re-
f erred to. The rules of evidence are familiar and 
not disputed by the respondent that extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible either to contradict 
or subtract from, add to or vary, the terms of a 
written instrument, and that, in the absence of 
accident, fraud, or mistake of fact, the execution 
of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede 
all of the stipulations concerning its terms or 
subject-matter which preceded or accompanied 
its execution. IO R.C.L. 1016. Texts and cases 
to that effect are cited by the appellant. I Elliott 
on Contracts, 19; 2 Elliott on Contracts, 937; 
Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162, 44 P. 715; Reese 
Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 
684." 
The reason that evidence of prior negotiations lead-
ing up to a contract is not properly admissible as evi-
' ilence to vary the terms of the contract is succinct}y set . . 
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forth by Ronan E. Degnan in "Parol Evidence - 'i'lit 
Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review 158, rn2 ( 19;Jrj 
as follows: 
" ... Contracts and other documents are 110r. 
mally if not always preceded by some negotiation 
and even perhaps by transaction. But erent. 
ually, if concord occurs at all, much of the pre-
liminary agreement and discussion will be aban-
doned or replaced by a final agreement of the 
parties; it is the jural act to which the law at. 
tributes changes in legal relationships. In short. 
the later agreement supersedes all former. Thus 
former negotiations or even agreements are ex-
cluded from a trial not because evidence as tu 
their existence would be untrustworthy hut be· 
cause they are legally immaterial; if their exist· 
ence were proved or even admitted it would not 
affect the rules of law to be applied in deter· 
mining the disposition of the case. This theory 
makes the name given the rule a misnomer in· 
deed-it states a preference for written over 
oral testimony, while the true foundation, accord-
ing to 'Vigmore, is a preference for subsequent 
agreement over prior." 
Exhibit l was never intended or considered b)· ' 
either party to the contract to amount to an agreement. i 
On September 9, 1960, J\fr. Chiodo sent an offer to sell 
his stock to .Mr. A. '"· Sanders (Ex. 18). In this offer 
1 
J\ir. Chiodo offers to sell if certain terms are agreed to. 
One of these terms is that the memorandum of .August 
3, 1960 "shall form a part of this agreement." This offer 
of Vincent Chiodo was not accepted and on November 
1 
4, 1960, a letter from V. F. Rigling (Ex. 5) was sent to 
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\'incent Chiodo. This letter enclosed a copy of the agree-
ment finally entered into but it was stated that: 
" ... in the event that such exchange trans-
action is consummated, and our nominees are 
then elected to the board of directors of Bear 
River Telephone Company, we will then cause 
Bear River Telephone Company to enter into 
an employment agreement with you, for a period 
of ten years, such agreement to be in the form 
attached hereto with such changes therein as may 
be agreed to." 
These subsequent negotiations evince the fact that 
neither party considered the conversation of August 3, 
1960 (Ex. 1) to be an agreement between them. Black's 
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition 89, defines an agree-
ment as: 
"The act of two or more persons, who unite 
in expressing a mutual and common purpose, 
with the view of altering their rights and obli-
gations. The union of two or more minds in a 
thing done or to be done; a mutual assent to 
do a thing." 
Effect of Exhibit 1 if it Is Adnii.1Jsihle as Evidence 
If the court should determine that Exhibit 1 1s 
admissible for all purposes, i.e., that the parol evidence 
rule is inapplicable in this case, plaintiff is not benefited. 
1 
The only conversation regarding an employment con-
' tract appears between pages 26 and 29 of Exhibit 1. 
111 this conversation Mr. Sanders says that he has been 
lerl to believe that Vincent Chiodo cannot be fired under 
the employment contract but this is a legal matter that 
should be taken up with a lawyer. 
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.Mr. Sanders was correct in his understanding. 'iiit 
only problem was that neither .Mr . .Sanders nor )Ir, 
Chiodo considered the possibility that Vincent Chiod(j 
might engage in the various activities which the evideu~t 
showed he did engage in. So long as Vincent Chiodo <luJ 
not violate the conditions of his employment which arr 
implied in law, Bear River Telephone Company had iw 
legal just cause for discharging him. However, }Ir. 
Sanders and Mr. Chiodo did not discuss what woulii 
happen if Vincent Chiodo should engage in actiritie1 ' 
of the nature disclosed by the evidence. According])·. 
Sanders and Chiodo could not have reached an agree-
ment as to what would happen if Vincent Chiodo su 
abused his position as manager. In the absence of such I 
an agreement limiting Bear River's rights to discharge 
l\:Ir. Chiodo the general legal rules pertaining to em· 
ployment contracts are applicable and Chiodo was boun<l 
to meet the standards of integrity of the usual mauager. 
The clear purpose of the conversation betweeu 
Chiodo and Sanders reflected in Exhibit I was that 
Chiodo having had experience with large corporatio11~ 
wanted reassurance that he would not be bound hy strict 
rules as to standard operating procedures commo11 tn 
such organizations. There is not the slightest hint iu the 
conservation nor in the other negotiations coneeming 
the terms of the employment agreement that Cliiorl11 
was to be allowed to raid the Company treasury at 11ill , 
to give special benefits to his children or to complcteh 
ignore the organizational chain of command of the Bear ' 
River Telephone Company. He was selling his contr,,J. 
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]tug interest. He was being retained as manager. There 
is nothing in Exhibit I which would indicate an intent 
un the part of General \Vaterworks Corporation as a 
prospective purchaser that Chiodo's status as manager 
would permit him to expend General 'Vaterworks' 
money for the benefit of himself and his family. 
\'. 'VHEN AN EMPLOYER IS HELD 
TO HAVE WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED 
I AN El\IPLOYEE, THE DAMAGES .MUST 
BE REDUCED BY THE A.MOUNT THE 
EMPLOYEE CAN EARN OVER THE BAL-
ANCE OF THE CONTRACT TERl\I 
THROUGH THE USE OF REASONABLE 
DILIGENCE. 
Although defendant believes that there was no 
wrongful discharge of Vincent Chiodo and that this 
court need not consider the question of damages, the 
following arguments are included in the event this 
conrt should conclude that defendant had no just cause 
for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo. 
There are two rules for the assessment of damages 
which have been followed by various courts. The Utah 
, Court has not yet determined which of the rules shall 
' be following in this state. 
A. Damages May Be Assessed Only to The Date of Trial, 
as Future Earnings Cannot Be Known at The Time of Trial. 
Some courts have determined that an employee who 
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brings an action for wrongful discharge before ti ii 
expiration of the employment term may only recorc
1 
damages up to the time of trial. See, e.g., Rohins()n , 
McAlhaney, 6 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1940); Mcllfulla 11 ; 
Dickinson Co., 62 N.,V. 120 (.Minn. 1895); Corby; 
Seventy-One Hundred Jeffery Ave. Bldg. Corp., 1; 11 
N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1945). 
The basis for this determination is that the em-
ployee can only recover for actual damages and sucl1 
damages are the amounts due under the contract less tlit 
amount the employee could earn by the exercise ol 
reasonable diligence. Because it is not possible to k11m1 
in advance what the discharged employee can earn b! 
reasonable diligence, the courts which follow this rule 
refuse to grant recovery beyond the date of trial. 
The facts of the present case provide a good 
example of why this rule is a reasonable and fair one. 
Yincent Chiodo testified at the trial (R. 45) : 
"Q Have you been employed by Bear Rirer 
since that date (December 12, 1963) ~ 
"A No, sir. 
"Q Have vou been able to find any other em· 
ployment? 
"A Not particularly. 
"Q 'Vhat have you had? 
"A I had four days of work with a firm in XP· 
braska and a few days in Canada. 
"Q How much have you earned in total in the i 
time since you were discharged? 
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"A Oh, about $500. 
"Q How did your expenses of getting that 
employment compare with the $500? 
"A I think I spent about 800. 
"Q In expenses to earn the five? 
"A I " n expenses, yes. 
Also, on cross examination, Vincent Chiodo testified as 
follows ( R. 76-78) : 
"Q Now, Mr. Chiodo, you testified yesterday 
in connection with your efforts to find other em-
ployment since your employment was terminated 
with the Bear River Telephone Company in De-
cember of 1963. 'Vould you describe just what 
you did and what efforts you made? 
"A 'Vell, I've met with the Snelling and 
Snelling people in an employment service in 
Stamford, Connecticut, and I have been referred 
or have referred myself to a number of people 
such as Service Design Company, Magrath En-
gineering Company, and for the moment I 
think that's it. 
"Q I notice you mentioned that you first found 
an opportunity or sought an opportunity to sell 
your company through advertisements in Tele-
phony, the magazine you referred to. 
"A Yes. 
"Q Have you looked in Telephony for adver-
tisements to see if there was a place for someone 
with your background? 
"A Now that you call that to my attention, I 
haYe sent in a 'number of resume~ to people in 
Telephony Magazine. 
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"Q H_ave you made any e~orts t'? find empliiy. 
ment m the telephone busmess with an RE.;\ 
cooperative? · 
"A I'm not sure of that. I'm not sure of that. 
"Q By that you mean you have not? 
"A I'm not sure whether I have or haven't. I 
don't know who the people in the Telephmw 
were. · · 
"MR. RA.MPTON: He didn't know whether 
the people he wrote were R.E.A. or not. 
"A I can't recall. 
"Q Now what other efforts have you made hi 
find employment? 
"A That's the extent of it. 
"Q Have you considered using your experi-
ence in the telephone and electronic business as 
a contractor or consultant, any of those things! 
"A Yes, I have. 
"Q Made any effort to do that? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Where? 
"A Oh, I've just been on the lookout for an 
opportunity that might arise. In fact, I hare 
contacted a firm in-what's the suburb inune· 
diately north of Los Angeles, right on the Pa· 
cific? Now it's a fair sized suburb. 
"MR. RAlVIPTON: Santa l\ilonica. 
"A Santa Monica, yes. I have contacted a fir111 
in Santa :Monica. 
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"Q I take it then that-
" A But no results. 
"Q Your interest in finding employment isn't 
confined to Tremonton or Box Elder County. 
You're willing to go any place? 
"A "\Vell, it all depends. It's got to be remune-
rative enough to pay me to take the loss in Tre-
monton. I just can't go to work for someone a 
thousand miles away and keep doing it at a loss. 
"Q I understand that, but you're willing, in 
other words, to work anywhere in the United 
States you can find suitable employment; is 
that correct? 
"A Absolutely. 
From this testimony, it could only be concluded 
that (1) Vincent Chiodo had no knowledge of any avail-
able employment, or (2) Vincent Chiodo was not telling 
the truth if he did have knowledge of available employ-
ment. 
The trial of this case was completed on December 
18, 1964, and Vincent Chiodo commenced work in 
Canada on January 8, 1965, where he was employed 
until July 31, 1965 ( R. 661 ) . During the course of this 
, employment Vincent Chiodo was paid $4,152.00 (R. 
i fi59) plus $7.28 per day for expenses. 
Beginning only a few days after the trial, Yin cent 
Chiodo actually earned in less than eight months 
$4.152.00, even though he had testified under oath that 
he had no knowledge of available employment. 
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Defendant has never contended that \'ince11t Chiudii 
was not technically able as an engineer nor that he \\ai 
not capable of performing any job assigned to him. '!'lie 
only contentions by defendant have been that Ynicc:ut r 
Chiodo for reasons of his own was unfaithful to the e 
interest of his employer, the Hear River Telepho11e Com- a 
pany, and that as a result of his actions Hear Hirer 
Telephone Company had just cause for his discharge, 
However, the trial court refused to take into account c 
the technical ability and training of Vincent Chiodo a~ 
an aid in determining what he might earn in the futme 
and rendered judgment for the total amount ot' the· 
wages to become due under the contract. In def ewlanfs 
motion for a new trial ( R. 655) , it was pointed out 
that Vincent Chiodo had been employed since short!)· 
after the termination of the trial and that knowledge of 
the availability of such employment was obviously had 
by him at the time of the trial. Despite the fact that it 
was known, prior to the judgment becoming final, th:il 
Vincent Chiodo had actually been gainfully emplo~·c1L 
the trial court still refused to exercise its duty as a fart , 
finder and determine, upon the basis of the known fads. 
how much Vincent Chiodo could expect to earn tJuough 
the exercise of reasonable diligence over the remaini11g , 
period of the employment contract. This refusal is onh ! 
consistent with the theory that judgment for darnagl' 
1
: 
to the date of trial is all that can be allowed. 1 
If no estimate as to Vincent Chiorlo's future earn· 
ings over the balance of the contract is to be made th11· 
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,, the judgment should only run to the date of trial so that 
1 
the employee is not given a windfall profit because of 
his discharge. Such windfall would arise by virtue of the 
t receipt in full of his wages from the past employer plus 
c ererything else he could earn from a new employer. The 
absence of such a rule would make it more desirable for 
r the employee to get fired than to do his best job to render 
good and loyal service to the employer and would be 
contrarv to the public good. 
B. If Damages Are Assessed Beyond the Date of Trial 
Then Such Damages Must Be Reduced By The Amount to Be 
Earned Over The Balance of The Contract Period Through The 
; Exercise of Reasonable Diligence by The Employee. 
It is recognized that the majority of courts which 
have decided the issue have permitted judgments to be 
entered beyond the date of trial where the contract 
period extends beyond such date. However, where such 
a result is obtained the courts require a determination 
of the amount which the employee could earn through 
, reasonable diligence. This rule is succinctly stated in 
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1095, p. 515, as follows: 
"If at the time of his wrongful discharge the 
employee has not substantially completed the 
service of a particular period for which a definite 
wage installment was the agreed equivalent, the 
employer is not yet a contract debtor for the 
amount of that wage instalment. The employee 
can maintain an action of damages for the 
wrongful breach, but he cannot maintain an 
action of debt for the agreed wages. The con-
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trary rule was once laid down by the En(rlisii 
courts, and it may still be followed in a Mfeii 
jurisdictions today. It was held that the eiu 
ployee might remain ready and willing to pn . 
form the agreed service and at the eud of thl · 
period of service maintain an action of debt fu
1 
the agreed wages. This has sometimes beeu re-'· 
fered to as the doctrine of constructive seni~e. 
The doctrine has been generally abandoned. 
however, because of the unnecessary economic' 
waste that it involves. In cases of this kind tht 
rule concerning avoidable consequences is gen-
erally of definite and easy application. The em-\ 
ployee, instead of remaining idle, is expected ! 
to get other service of a like character if he ean 
do so by making a reasonable amount of effort. ! 
The damages that he can recover for a wro11gful i c 
discharge, therefore, are the total amount of the 1 f 
unpaid wages that were promised to him for his 
service, less the amount that he can earn br 
making reasonable effort to obtain similar sen:· : 
ice under another employer. It is not necessar)' I 1 
for him to take any serious bodily or financial · 
risks or to accept service of a kind that in itself · 
is distinctly less desirable. It should be ob- ' 
served that other service is not in itself less de- , 
sirable merely because the wages offered there-
for are lower in amount." 
35 Am. Jur., ~laster and Servant,§ 57, p. 490, states i11 
pertinent part: 
" Nor does the mere fact that a wrong 
fully discharged employee has not obtained other 
employment or has not been paid cumpensab 111 
from anv other source necessarilv entitle him to 
recover the full contract price o{ his senices for 
the unexpired term of his contract with thf' rk 
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·I 
I! 
fendant. It is a well-settled principle that upon 
the breach of a contract of employment calling 
for personal services by the wrongful discharge 
of the employee, the latter is required to use 
reasonable efforts to obtain other employment 
of like nature for the purpose of lessening or 
minimizing the damages. In short, in an action 
by a wrongfully discharged employee for the 
breach of his contract of employment the de-
fendant employer may reduce the amount of 
the damages recoverable by whatever the plain-
tiff has earned or by reasonable diligence could 
have earned in other employment subsequent to 
his discharge. 
In order to be entitled to reduce the damages 
1 
/ claimed, the employer is not required to prove that the 
, , employee will in fact find employment. The employee 
I 
I 
may refuse any and all employment but the damages 
1
' must still be reduced by the amount which the employee 
• I 
1
• i would earn by reasonable effort. This rule is stated in 
! · Section 1095, 5 Corbin on Contracts, p. 518, as follows: 
f 
I 
:1 i 
"It has frequently been said that the employee 
is under a 'duty' to mitigate damages by looking 
for other work and accepting it if it can be ob-
tained. Accurately speaking, however, this is not 
the case. It makes no difference whatever whether 
the employee actually uses the time that is set 
free for his use by the employer's discharge or 
does not use it. His recoverable damages are 
exactly the same in either case. He is legally 
privileged to throw away his time if he so de-
sires." 
i This same rule is stated in different words in the A.L.R . 
. \nnotation, 81 A.L.R. 282-283, as follows: 
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"It is commonly said that. the rule imv1 1,i co 
on a plaintiff the duty of takmg all reasoii:it. . 
. . . tl J 'l'l ' lS steps to mm1m1ze ie oss. ie use of the ten 
'duty' in this connection, while perhaps conn
1
, cc 
ent, is loose and inaccurate. There is no eur' y( 
responding right to require the avoidance .', C 
unnecessary loss; a party is not subject to an :1, C 
tion for a breach of the so-called duty. Rock: 
Vandine ( 1920) 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. l.i; si 
.fl!IcClelland v. Climax Hosiery 1llills (193u 
252 N.Y. 357, 169 N.E. 605, concurring opmio: n 
of Cardozo, Ch. J. what is meant by the suv·, 
posed duty is m~rely that, if ,a plaintiff neglect·.\ v 
to do what ordmary and reasonable prudenrc' 
dictates to lessen the damages, he will not 11, r 
heard to say that the loss properly clrnrgeaLl· 
to his own neglect is a j ural consequence of tb: 
wrong such consequences are deemed not to tl011. 
directly and naturally from the wrongful act.I\ 
and are regarded as remote. It is considereu! 
that the will of the plaintiff intenenes at !ht 
time the cause of action accrues, and that th. 
loss resulting to him thereafter is sufferni 
through his own act." 
The trial court refused to make any redudion 11: 
the judgment because of the reasonably anticipated 
future earnings of Vincent Chiodo (R. 61G) en1; 
though, on the motion for a new trial ( R. 655-fi58) it 
was admitted by plaintiff that he had been employed 
nearly continuously from the date of the trial arnl unl 1i ' 
after the date of the entry of judgment. 
If Vincent Chiodo is entitled to recover 011 bis c11 1• 
ployment contract then the law clearly requires the f:ii·i 
finder to make a determination of what the emp1°~t·r 
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could earn by reasonable effort on his part. The record 
is clear that Vincent Chiodo is a trained engineer having 
fi completed the junior year of college (R. 18) with many 
'.'r rears experience in the telephone business. Vincent 
" C'hiodo claimed to have built the Bear River Telephone 
1, Company from a "high wire outfit" (R. 21) which "was 
.
0 
bad you hardly would call it a community outfit" ~ . 
(R. 21-22) to "the best physical condition of any com-
JL rnunity plant anywhere in the state of Utah" ( R. 23). 
p·, Defendant never contested the fact that Vincent Chiodo 
1,:: 1rns a capable engineer or could have been a competent 
l'! 
11 
manager. 
Certainly the trial court had sufficient evidence to 
1t' permit it to determine that Vincent Chiodo could, by 
11
1 reasonable effort, have reduced his damages substau-~I tially. This conclusion is substantiated by the facts, 
't which are a part of the record on the motion for a new 
trial, that Vincent Chiodo did in fact earn $4,152.00, 
plus expenses, during a period of less than seven months. 
If Yincent Chiodo is entitled to recover for breach of 
contract then the case should be remanded to the trial 
eourt for a determination of the amount which Vincent 
Chiodo could earn by making reasonable efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bear River Telephone Company submits that 
the record in this case shows : 
I. The contract between Bear River Telephone 
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Company and Vincent Chiodo was an employultiil 
agreement for ten years - one of the implied terms (;i 
which was that the employee could not be dischargtJ 
except for good cause. But equally it implied that tl1t 
employee would be a faithful and loyal servant. 
~. 'l'he Bear River Telephone Company had good 
and sufficient cause for the discharge of Vincent Chiud11 
in that: 
(a) Vincent Chiodo personally falsified payroll . 
records for his son, Don Chiodo, and instructed his sub- · I 
ordinate employees to also falisfy payroll records so , I 
Don Chiodo could be paid by Bear River 'l'elephom 
Company while he was actually employed in Montana , 
by another company. Vincent Chiodo also permitted , 
and condoned other payroll practices permitting im· 
proper payments to be made to members of his family. : 
He instructed subordinate employees to improperly re· 
port their own time and thus subject the compan~· !11 1 
liability under the federal wage and hour laws. 
(b) Vincent Chiodo wrote letters to his superiors 1, 
I 
which were disrespectful and insolent and demonstrated 1 
a general refusal to cooperate with other employees of 
Bear River Telephone Company. I, I 
( c) Vincent Chiodo actively engaged in a subter· 1 I 
fuge to obtain the stock of the Bear River Te!ephorw •I 
Company from its shareholders for an undisclosed prin 
cipal at the same time he was employed as manager :iud 
vice-president of Bear River Telephone Company and 
had the highest duty of loyalty to the said stockholder 
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(d) Vincent Chiodo did interfere with plans of the 
· cipal stockholder of Bear River Telephone Com-pru1 
. which had been made known to him on a confiden-
pall) . . .. 
tial basis by sending letters to the Utah Public Utilities 
Commission and the R.E.A. in 'Vashington, D.C. 
(e) Vincent Chiodo knowingly permitted his sons 
to profit from contracts nominally entered into in the 
names of other for work of the Bear River Telephone 
Company through the use of Bear River Telephone 
• Company employees who were being paid by the Ilea r 
' River Telephone Company for their time. 
I 
(f) Vincent Chiodo instructed his subordinate em-
ployees to not give the company officers in New London 
any information unless it was specifically requested and 
i prevented the employees from giving their full cooper-
: ation making the administration of the affairs of Bear 
; River Telephone Company more difficult and costly. 
3. The most that can be said for the transcript of 
ihe conversation between the representative of General 
1
; Waterworks Corporation and Chiodo preceding the sale 
of the stock and execution of the employment agreement 
•is that Chiodo was given some leeway from strict stand-
: arrl operating procedures in the local management of 
1 the Company. Assuming the conversation was ratified 
. by Bear River Telephone Company merely by the 
~xecution of the employment agreement, there is nothing 
111 such conversation or other evidence of negotiations 
loindicate that it was contemplated Chiodo was author-
. ized to be dishonest, disrespectful, or disloyal. The tov 
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management of Bear River Telephone Company in. 
dured nearly three years of this type of conduct. Ti,. 
fact that its patience reached an end only in Deceml~r,' 
1963, should not impose liability for action it could hai I 
taken earlier. · 
4. If Bear River Telephone Company did not ha1,I 
just cause for the discharge of Vincent Chiodo, tliti 1 
the case should be remanded to the trial court for,: 
determination of the amount which Vincent ChiorJ,,l 
I 
would, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, ear
1
,i 
~ver the remaining period of th~ contract or reduce tlk\ 
Judgment to the damages sustamed to the date of triai. 
I 
Respectfully submitted, I 
PETER w. BILLINGS I 
DALE E. ANDERSON ! 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building \ 
Salt Lake City, Utah \ 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellmd, 
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